United Nations S/2009/112

Security Council

Distr.: General
24 February 2009

Original: English/French

Letter dated 23 February 2009 from the representatives of France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

We should be grateful if you would circulate to Security Council members the attached updated version of the United Kingdom-France non-paper on peacekeeping (see annex), as a document of the Security Council. This has been revised to take account of the discussion during the Security Council debate on peacekeeping on 23 January, and the informal seminar on 22 January.

We look forward to the first meeting of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations under your Chairmanship on 25 February.

(*Signed*) Jean-Maurice **Ripert**

(*Signed*) Karen **Pierce**

09-24864 (E) 250209

Annex to the letter dated 23 February 2009 from the representatives of France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]

Non-paper

1. **Peacekeeping is an essential tool in the hands of the United Nations.** Looking back on the last 60 years, it has had a remarkable record in preventing war and suffering, and facilitating long-term political solutions in often intractable situations.

2. **United Nations peacekeeping has also had, and is still facing, serious difficulties.** Some are inherent to peacekeeping itself. Others are related to the specific division of responsibilities that characterizes the Organization, and the practices that have developed over time. Others are related to the current rapid growth in the number of operations, a critical factor at a time when resources are scarce. A final set is related to the increasing complexity of operations, and the general awareness that no sustainable peace can take hold without a comprehensive approach to the protection of civilians, justice, human rights, and peacebuilding. We need progress across all strands of this activity.

3. **The challenges are immense. In our view, several should be addressed as a matter of priority:**

Effective strategic oversight: the first area to address, as a prerequisite and a common denominator to all peacekeeping issues, is the quality of preparation, planning, oversight and evaluation of operations, in order to ensure there is progress towards a clear strategic goal. Considerable progress can be made by improving the information flow between the Security Council, the Secretariat, and troop-contributing countries; improving the quality of military advice available to the Council, risk analysis, and transparency across the chain of command; improving resolution drafting, including on benchmarks and completion strategies.

Resource constraints: there is an obvious overstretch, with huge costs, strains on efficiency on the ground and at Headquarters, which makes it more difficult to react to new crises. It can be addressed in six basic ways: (1) considering alternatives to peacekeeping and rigorously assessing new commitments; (2) substituting civilian activities for military activities where appropriate; (3) "outsourcing" activities to third parties and sharing the burden with other organizations; (4) closing existing operations; (5) downsizing existing operations; (6) increasing our cost-efficiency, including on the logistics and sourcing side. Serious efforts should be undertaken to address all six.

Lessons from implementation: there are gaps between mandates contained in Security Council resolutions and their implementation on the ground, which vary according to the provisions concerned, and to Force Commanders/Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and troop contributors in charge. Work should be undertaken to assess which mandate provisions are under-implemented and why. The aim should be to draw lessons for resolution drafters, for the composition of the mission and for dialogue with troop-contributing countries. This

assessment should also cover issues related to the implementation of complex mandates (balance and integration of civilian and military activities; implementation of provisions on human rights, protection of civilians, and judicial issues).

4. **While the Security Council has a special responsibility for peacekeeping under the Charter, peacekeeping is an equity of the whole membership and the whole United Nations system.** Our discussions should be conducted in closest coordination with the Secretary-General, the Secretariat, troop-contributing countries, and Member States hosting peacekeeping operations. Dialogue should also be intensified with the bodies and institutions that have complementary mandates in this area, including the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the Peacebuilding Commission, relevant United Nations agencies and programmes, and the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping chaired by Japan.

5. **France and the United Kingdom intend to launch a collaborative process, with the aim of achieving a first set of concrete results by August 2009.** Our aim is for this process to be closely aligned with other reviews of peacekeeping being carried out by Member States and the Secretariat.

6. **As a first step, we propose to address the issue of effective strategic oversight.** A first series of proposals is articulated below, for the members' consideration.

Effective strategic oversight

Improving the preparation, planning, monitoring and evaluation of United Nations peacekeeping operations

In the light of the manifold increase in peacekeeping operations, the complexity and robustness of their mandates and the insecurity of the environments in which they take place, in-depth reflection is required, with a view to improving their preparation, planning, monitoring and evaluation.

In January 2007, the Council stressed in a presidential statement (S/PRST/2007/1) the "importance of a more strategic approach to the oversight and direction of peacekeeping, to maximize the prospects for successful transition in the countries concerned, and to make possible the most effective use of scarce peacekeeping resources". Such an approach is all the more relevant now, as evidenced in the recent Security Council debates on MONUC and the Kivu crisis.

In the United Nations system, the management of peacekeeping operations is decentralized. Security Council resolutions create peacekeeping operations and their mandates. The planning process and the monitoring are entrusted to the United Nations Secretariat. The operation itself is directed in the field by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Force Commander, using the resources provided by troop-contributing countries. The capacity of the United Nations Strategic Military Headquarters in New York to provide direction and oversight to missions is limited.

Four issues, inter alia, deserve specific attention:

- how to reinforce the Council's and the Secretariat's work on preparation, planning and monitoring at the strategic level in New York;
- how to ensure that each Security Council member State receives coherent and accurate military analysis;
- how to reinforce the dialogue between the Council, the United Nations Secretariat and the troop-contributing countries on the military dimension of peacekeeping operations;
- how to improve mission effectiveness and how to embed best practice.

In this regard, the following actions could be considered:

A. Preparation and planning of operations

- Facilitate Security Council decision-making on the strategic effect required to maintain peace and security, how to respond appropriately to the threat to peace and security if there is one, including deciding whether a peacekeeping operation is appropriate, what its key tasks should be and how these should be reflected in the mandate, building on a sound strategic and military assessment.

To that end:

- The Security Council should develop the currently emerging practice of regular strategic joint briefings, both cross-cutting and on individual peacekeeping operations, by the Office of Military Affairs and the Department

of Peacekeeping Operations, with political-military experts of the Security Council. The Council should also ensure it has time, before a peacekeeping operation is mandated and at review points, to discuss fully and at high level the strategic context.

– Examine the means to provide Security Council members with adequate, high-quality military advice.

– The Secretariat may wish to consider providing more systematic reporting to the Security Council on strategic-level documents (i.e. CONOPS).

– The Secretariat may wish to consider providing the Security Council with early sight of the financial implications of its decisions.

• The Security Council should develop best practice for authorizing new missions, including a set of principles based on Brahimi, and drafting guidelines for resolutions.

• The Secretariat may wish to consider improving the strategic-level planning process and interaction with the field (Special Representative of the Secretary-General or Force Commander): adequate update of strategic-level documents to match the evolution of military requirements; ownership and validation of main documents elaborated in the field (i.e. OPLAN).

• Coordinated action to implement a more active policy of preparation and management of troop contributions to ensure adequately trained and equipped troops are deployed, by strengthening dialogue with troop-contributing countries, including on the issue of caveats. Long-term programmes of capacity-building, in both individual States and regional organizations, and improved sharing of peacekeeping military doctrine and best practice could contribute to this.

Throughout the planning and preparation stage, two overriding principles should apply:

– Mandates should have clear strategic political objectives and should identify key benchmarks which the Secretary-General can report against and which the Council can base its evaluations on.

– All relevant parts of the United Nations system should be brought into the process as early as possible, to ensure a joined-up approach and to maximize the prospects for success on the ground.

B. Monitoring and conduct of operations

• The Security Council and Secretariat should ensure they improve their exchange of information, and the quality of that information, on the conduct of operations, in particular more complex operations, through regular and ad hoc meetings, at the level of political-military experts of the Council. The Council and Secretariat could also agree on guidelines on the information that should be included in the reports of the Secretary-General. Increased involvement of troop-contributing countries would also be desirable. This will enable the Security Council to update or reduce tasks and adjust the level of resources to meet these tasks. It will also aid the Council in monitoring success.

- The Secretariat may wish to strengthen monitoring capabilities in New York, including the ability to generate without delay appropriate information on the military situation and the actions carried out by the peacekeeping operation, with a view to:

– having an assessment of the situation;

– being in a position to inform the Council and capitals.

To that end, it would be important to increase the military information flow between the Secretariat and the field.

- There should be some reflection on the regulatory framework under which Secretariat staff operate in the field, which was not designed for fast-moving, complex operations in high-risk environments, and on the amount of administration field staff have to deal with, which diverts them from political/strategic tasks.

C. Evaluation of operations

- The Security Council and the Secretariat should improve dialogue on the evaluation of operations, including convening systematically, before mandate renewals, meetings of political-military experts of the Council with the Secretariat.

- The Council and the Secretariat may wish to consider strengthening its evaluation process through:

– a better integration into the evaluation process of the objectives laid down in the planning documents;

– involvement of the Council's military and peacekeeping experts in the evaluation process;

– better taking into account the result of evaluations in deciding on mandate renewal and adaptation;

– better dialogue with troop-contributing countries to draw conclusions on the action of each contingent deployed within an operation.

United Nations A/ES-10/449–S/2009/113

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
25 February 2009

Original: English

General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Sixty-fourth year

Identical letters dated 25 February 2009 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

As the situation on the ground continues to deteriorate, I am compelled to draw your attention to the ongoing attempts by Israel, the occupying Power, to unlawfully alter the status, demographic composition and character of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly East Jerusalem.

Through its illegal settlement activities — including the confiscation of land, construction and expansion of settlements, settlement "outposts" and settlement infrastructure, transfer of Israeli settlers and construction of the wall, as well as by means of home demolitions, excavations, residency restrictions and other unlawful measures — Israel continues to create a myriad of illegitimate facts on the ground in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, severing the Territory into separate and non-contiguous parts; isolating East Jerusalem from the rest of the Territory; displacing thousands of Palestinians from their homes; and destroying some communities in their entirety.

In this regard, in follow-up to my previous letters to you regarding Israel's illegal colonization activities, I regret to inform you of the demolition and eviction orders recently issued by Israel, the occupying Power, in Palestinian neighbourhoods of Occupied East Jerusalem. In the past week, the occupying Power ordered the eviction of dozens of Palestinian families from their homes in the Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood in the centre of East Jerusalem by ordering the evacuation of 27 homes there. This was followed by a decision during the current week to order the eviction of 1,500 Palestinians from their homes in the Al-Bustan neighbourhood of East Jerusalem.

Contrary to the false, empty pretext given by Israel, the orders clearly aim at the illegal confiscation of Palestinian property and land and the forced displacement of more Palestinian civilians from East Jerusalem. These unlawful and provocative orders by the occupying Power have stoked already heightened tensions, threatening

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to further destabilize the fragile situation on the ground and, moreover, have been thoroughly rejected by the Palestinian people and their leadership.

As we have repeatedly warned, the direct and deliberate intent of all of these illegal colonization measures is to entrench Israel's presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and to facilitate its attempts to illegally acquire and de facto annex even more Palestinian land. Such destructive, racist and colonial policies and measures constitute grave violations of international law, including international humanitarian and human rights law, and the Security Council has, in numerous resolutions, clearly declared the illegality and invalidity of such measures by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

These unlawful measures are seriously undermining the contiguity, integrity, viability and unity of the Palestinian Territory. Moreover, as has been widely recognized, this relentless land grab is gravely jeopardizing — if not completely destroying — the prospect for physically realizing the two-State solution for peace, on which there exists an international consensus.

The international community, including the Security Council, must act to address these dangerous developments. Israel, the occupying Power, cannot be permitted to continue to so flagrantly and grossly breach international law without consequence. The international community must demand Israel's compliance with all of its obligations under international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention, by which it is bound as the occupying Power, and demand the cessation of all of its illegal policies in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem.

Hope and belief in the potential for making peace a reality are rapidly diminishing in the face of such incessant Israeli breaches of international law and violations of the human rights of the Palestinian people under its occupation since 1967. Peace and security in the Middle East can never be achieved by colonization, displacement, disenfranchisement, collective punishment and oppression; it can only be achieved by respect for international law, human rights and United Nations resolutions. Urgent action is thus required by the international community, including all relevant United Nations bodies, to stop this illegal behaviour by Israel, which runs totally contrary to and is destroying the purpose, spirit and goals of the peace process, to the irreversibility of which the Security Council declared its commitment in resolution 1850 (2008).

The present letter is in follow-up to our previous 334 letters to you regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, since 28 September 2000. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 18 February 2009 (A/ES-10/448-S/2009/98), constitute a basic record of the crimes being committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, State terrorism and systematic human rights violations committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice. (As all the victims have not yet been identified, their names will be included in an annex to a future letter.)

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Riyad **Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer

United Nations A/63/739–S/2009/114

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
26 February 2009

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-third session
Agenda items 97, 98 and 99

Crime prevention and criminal justice

International drug control

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Sixty-fourth year

Identical letters dated 19 February 2009 from the Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour, on behalf of members of the Pacific Islands Forum based in New York, to transmit herewith a copy of the conclusions of the regional consultation workshop on measures for the legislative implementation of the legal regime against terrorism in the Pacific region and related technical assistance delivery, held in Suva on 2 and 3 June 2008 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 97, 98 and 99, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Rosemary **Banks**
Permanent Representative

09-25097 (E) 030309

Annex to the identical letters dated 19 February 2009 from the Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

Regional Consultation Workshop on measures for the legislative implementation of the legal regime against terrorism in the Pacific region and related technical assistance delivery

Suva, 2 and 3 June 2008

Organized by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in cooperation with the Pacific Islands Forum secretariat

Workshop conclusions

We, the participants of the Regional Consultation Workshop on measures for the legislative implementation of the legal regime against terrorism in the Pacific region and related technical assistance delivery, held in Suva, Fiji, on 2 and 3 June 2008;

Representing the following Pacific Islands Forum countries:

- Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu;

Reaffirming the conclusions of the Regional Consultation Workshop held in Nadi, Fiji, on 25 and 26 June 2007 (A/62/542-S/2007/664);

Acknowledging the ongoing work undertaken by Forum Members in complying with their international obligations and relevant regional instruments relating to counter- terrorism and their determination to continue undertaking the required national action;

Expressing our appreciation to the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) and the 1540 Committee Expert Group for their contributions to the Workshop;

Expressing our appreciation to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Pacific Islands Forum secretariat (PIFS) for their initiative in organizing this Regional Consultation Workshop;

Have agreed on the following conclusions:

1. Recognize the efforts of participating countries in reviewing their existing domestic laws and developing new counter terrorism legislation;

2. Acknowledge the technical assistance which has been provided by the Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) of UNODC, in partnership with the PIFS and other relevant providers of assistance;

3. Welcome the continuing availability of UNODC/TPB and the PIFS to provide on-the-ground and sustained support to the Forum Islands countries and observers and, for this purpose, undertake the following types of activities:

   - National level technical support, advisory services and other required expertise assistance in the legal areas relating to counter-terrorism, especially for the ratification of the counter-terrorism instruments and the legislative incorporation of their provisions into national legislation, including through drafting assistance;

   - National level training for relevant criminal justice (including law enforcement) officials to build counter-terrorism legal capacity for achieving the effective application of the legal regime against terrorism;

   - Regional consultations and workshops for the Pacific Islands countries and observers on specialized substantive legal issues, to foster specialized knowledge and expert capacity to address those issues;

   - Senior policy-level workshops on strengthening the legal regime against terrorism, especially to review progress being made and provide guidance for required further steps pertaining to technical assistance needs and delivery.

4. Recommend Forum Members and observers to continue to draw on the specialized legal and related technical assistance services offered by UNODC/TPB in partnership with the PIFS;

5. Request UNODC to hold, in partnership with the PIFS, further consultations on this issue as required;

6. Take note of the consultations with UNODC, CTED and the 1540 Committee Expert Group, and the continued efforts of participating countries;

7. Recognize that broader law enforcement programs will complement the implementation of the universal counter-terrorism instruments;

8. Request the PIFS to bring the conclusions of this consultation workshop to the attention of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations, for apprising them of the measures being envisaged for technical assistance delivery to the Pacific Islands countries;

9. Take note of the legal and related technical assistance needs indicated during the bilateral consultations with UNODC by the following countries:

Cook Islands

Processes for ratification of the remaining universal counter-terrorism instruments; legislative drafting assistance for implementing legislation. Training for criminal justice and judicial officers on the legal aspects of the universal legal framework.

Federated States of Micronesia

Assistance with processes related to the ratification of the remaining counter-terrorism instruments; legislative drafting for implementing legislation.

Fiji

Legislative drafting assistance; ongoing training for criminal justice, judicial and other officials on legal elements of the universal instruments.

Kiribati

Basic training for law enforcement officers; assistance with drafting of legislation to implement remaining counter-terrorism instruments.

Nauru

Training for criminal justice and judicial officers on counter-terrorism issues.

Niue

Assistance with processes relating to the ratification of the remaining counter-terrorism instruments; training for criminal justice, judicial, and other officers on legal elements of the counter-terrorism instruments; review of existing counter-terrorism legislation and related legislative drafting.

Palau

The review of existing counter-terrorism legislation and advice on legislative amendments necessary to achieve full compliance; assistance with related drafting; assistance with reporting to the relevant United Nations Security Council Committees dealing with counter-terrorism.

Republic of the Marshall Islands

Training for criminal justice and judicial officers on counter-terrorism issues.

Samoa

Assistance with legislative drafting; ratification processes for the remaining instruments; and training for criminal justice and judicial officers on the legal elements of the universal framework.

Solomon Islands

Assistance with processes related to the ratification of the remaining counter-terrorism instruments; training for criminal justice and judicial officers on the legal elements of the universal framework.

Tuvalu

Assistance with procedures related to the ratification of the remaining counter-terrorism instruments; training for criminal justice and judicial officers on the legal elements of the universal framework.

United Nations A/63/742–S/2009/115

General Assembly
Security Council

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26 February 2009

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-third session
Agenda item 21
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Sixty-fourth year

Letter dated 25 February 2009 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 24 February 2009, addressed to you by Kemal Gökeri, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I will be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 21, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Baki **İlkin**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

09-25091 (E) 040309

Annex to the letter dated 25 February 2009 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 6 February 2009, addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative and circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council (A/63/711-S/2009/81), which yet again contains well-known allegations of violations of "international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus", and to bring to your kind attention the following:

As stated in our previous communications addressed to you, habitually repeated allegations by the Greek Cypriot side of so-called "airspace violations" are totally unfounded and are rejected in toto by our authorities. The present allegations do not merit a detailed reply as they are of a similar nature. However, I wish to emphasize, once again, that flights within the sovereign airspace and flight information region of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and consent of the appropriate authorities of the State. The Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or right of say over flights within the national airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that allegations of so-called violations of air traffic regulations are invalid, as the civil aviation authority of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the only competent authority to provide air traffic and aeronautical information services.

The Greek Cypriot administration should be reminded, once again, that its counterpart is, and has always been, the Turkish Cypriot side, not Turkey. I also deem it imperative to point out, once again, that the attitude demonstrated by the Greek Cypriot representatives in their constant repetition of false claims is nothing more than rhetoric, which unfortunately wastes the precious time and energy of the international community.

Lastly, I would like to put on record once again that the Turkish Cypriot side is ready and doing its best to achieve a settlement in the form of a new partnership which will be in line with the established United Nations parameters and body of work. Bizonality, political equality of the two peoples, the equal status of the two constituent states and the continuation of Turkey's effective guarantee will constitute the parameters for a solution to the Cyprus problem. Removal of the existing isolations imposed on Turkish Cypriots and equal treatment of the two sides by the international community will surely contribute positively to the efforts towards reaching a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 21, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) M. Kemal **Gökeri**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

United Nations S/2009/116

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 February 2009

Original: English

Letter dated 26 February 2009 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Security Council heard, at its meeting on Iraq today, 26 February 2009, certain baseless allegations against the Islamic Republic of Iran made by the representative of the United States of America. Since the format of the said meeting did not allow my delegation to make a statement at the Council meeting, I should therefore be grateful if you could bring to the attention of the members of the Council the position of my delegation on the said unfounded allegations, as contained in the attachment to the present letter, and circulate it as a document of the Security Council (see annex).

(*Signed*) Mohammad **Khazaee**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

09-25079 (E) 260209

Annex to the letter dated 26 February 2009 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Response of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations to the allegations made against Iran by the representative of the United States of America in the Security Council meeting held on 26 February 2009

It is unfortunate that the Security Council has heard yet again some baseless allegations against the Islamic Republic of Iran made by the representative of the United States in today's meeting of the Council on Iraq.

Despite the allegations made by the representative of the United States, Iran's nuclear programme has been, is and will remain absolutely peaceful, and Iran has never tried, nor will it ever try, to acquire nuclear weapons. It is unfortunate that, yet again, we are hearing the same tired, unwarranted and groundless allegations that used to be unjustifiably and futilely repeated by the previous United States Administration.

The allegation of terrorism made against Iran is also equally baseless and absurd. As a victim of terrorism, we have always condemned terrorism in all its aspects and manifestations.

Instead of raising allegations against others, the United States had better take concrete and meaningful steps to correct its past wrong policies and practices vis-à-vis other nations, including the Islamic Republic of Iran.

United Nations S/2009/117

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 February 2009

Original: English

Identical letters dated 25 February 2008 from the representatives of Cuba, Oman, Senegal and Uganda to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

We write to you and through you to all members of the Security Council on the burning issue of the Sudan and the International Criminal Court at this critical juncture. You are well aware that throughout past times regional and international organizations were unanimous in drawing the attention of the Security Council and the international community to the potential destabilizing effects in the event that the Pre-trial Chamber of the Court issues a warrant of arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir, President of the Republic of the Sudan. Regional and international organizations expressed their deep concern that the action of the International Criminal Court could seriously undermine the ongoing efforts aimed at facilitating the early resolution of the conflict in Darfur and the promotion of long-lasting peace and reconciliation in the Sudan. They also expressed their deep concern that the action could further lead to greater destabilization for the country and the entire region. In accordance with its mandate within the framework of the Rome Statute and in line also with its Charter responsibilities to ensure the maintenance of peace and stability, it is the responsibility of the Security Council to avert threats to peace and to take necessary measures to guard against such threats.

Guided by the above-mentioned considerations and the positions expressed by the various regional and international organizations, and in order to defuse this new and dangerous situation and prevent its recurrence, and in view also of the delicate nature of the peace processes under way in the Sudan, the undersigned, representing regional and international organizations, request the United Nations Security Council, at this critical time, to take the necessary and urgent measure to defer, in accordance with article 16 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the process initiated by the Court, taking into account the need to ensure that ongoing peace efforts under the African Union/Arab League and the joint Chief Mediator are not jeopardized, and that the situation is not further inflamed. This request is also warranted in view of the need to augment the positive developments in the deployment of UNAMID and in the issue of accountability and reconciliation, along with the profound need to advance the peace efforts.

09-25134 (E) 270209

We would like, in conclusion, to request you to circulate this letter to all members of the Security Council and to have it issued as a Council document.

(*Signed*) Ileana B. **Núñez Mordoche**
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i. of Cuba to the United Nations
Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement

(*Signed*) Mohammed Aqeel **Ba-Omar**
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i. of Oman to the United Nations
Chairman of the Group of Arab States

(*Signed*) Paul **Badji**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations
Chairman of the Group of African States

(*Signed*) Ruhakana **Rugunda**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations
Chairman of the OIC Group of States

United Nations S/2009/118

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 February 2009

Original: English

Letter dated 26 February 2009 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the summary statement by the Secretary-General on matters of which the Security Council is seized and on the stage reached in their consideration. In accordance with the procedure set out in document S/2008/847, my delegation requests that the following items be retained on the summary statement:

79. The situation between Iraq and Kuwait

82. Protection of United Nations personnel, associated personnel and humanitarian personnel in conflict zones

86. Kimberley Process Certification Scheme

105. Letters dated 26 July 2005 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2005/485 and S/2005/489).

I should be grateful if you could arrange for the text of this letter to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) John **Sawers**

09-25221 (E) 020309

United Nations S/2009/119

Security Council

Distr.: General
3 March 2009

Original: English

Ninth report of the Secretary-General on Security Council resolution 1701 (2006)

I. Introduction

1. This is the ninth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). It provides a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of the resolution since the last report of the Secretary-General was issued on 18 November 2008 (S/2008/715).

2. During the first part of the reporting period, the military and security situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) remained stable. In late December 2008, tension in the area rose with the outbreak of the Gaza crisis. During that period, rockets were fired on two occasions from southern Lebanon towards Israel, and Israel responded with artillery fire. A possible third rocket attack was prevented by the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL. During the latter part of the reporting period, tension subsided; however, recent days saw a third rocket attack incident. UNIFIL maintained close liaison and coordination with the parties through the tripartite mechanism and bilateral channels.

3. In spite of these serious incidents, I am pleased to report that all parties continue to express their support for and commitment to the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). This is illustrated by the measures taken by the parties to avoid further escalation and defuse a potentially destabilizing situation. These incidents, however, also highlight the precarious nature of the current cessation of hostilities and the necessity for both parties to take further steps to address a number of unresolved issues, described in detail in this report. These issues continue to hinder an agreement on a permanent ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel. Their resolution is required in order to move towards a permanent solution between the two countries.

4. The implementation of the agreement reached by Lebanese leaders at Doha in May 2008 has continued to ensure a period of relative calm in Lebanon. No major security incidents, other than the aforementioned rocket attacks, took place during the reporting period. In accordance with constitutional provisions, on 4 January 2009, the Minister of the Interior announced that the next parliamentary elections will be held on Sunday, 7 June. Continued progress in the bilateral relationship between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic saw the Lebanese Government announce the name of its ambassador to the Syrian Arab Republic on 27 January 2009. For its part, the Syrian Arab Republic opened an embassy in Beirut in late

09-25326 (E) 050309

December 2008. However, it has yet to appoint an ambassador to Lebanon. During the reporting period, the political situation in Israel was marked by the electoral campaign for the parliamentary elections held on 10 February.

II. Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006)

A. Situation in the UNIFIL area of operations

5. The parties generally maintained respect for the Blue Line, with the notable exceptions of the rocket firings from southern Lebanon towards Israel and the retaliatory artillery fire by Israel. Daily intrusions into Lebanese airspace by Israeli aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles continued at a high level throughout the reporting period in violation of Lebanese sovereignty and resolution 1701 (2006), reaching their peak during the Gaza crisis. UNIFIL protested all violations. The Government of Lebanon continued to protest these overflights, which the Government of Israel maintained were necessary security measures, citing alleged lack of enforcement of the arms embargo.

6. On 25 December 2008, the Lebanese Armed Forces discovered eight rockets on agricultural land in Wadi Hamul, two kilometres north-east of Naqoura (Sector West), after being alerted to their presence by a Lebanese civilian. The Lebanese Armed Forces, assisted by UNIFIL, defused and dismantled the rockets, which were armed and ready to be launched in the direction of Israel. The Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL jointly conducted an investigation into the incident. Subsequently, UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces searched potential rocket launching areas and increased their overall presence in the area of operations, with a particular focus on sensitive areas along the Blue Line, from which, according to UNIFIL assessments, rockets could be launched.

7. On 8 January, two rockets were fired across the Blue Line from an area 100 metres from the village of Tayr Harfa (Sector West). One of the rockets struck inside a home for the elderly in Nahariyya, Israel, lightly injuring one resident, while the second landed in a forest near the Israeli village of Matsuva. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces immediately dispatched troops to the site of the rocket launch, but no suspects were found in its vicinity. Eleven minutes after the rockets were launched, the Israel Defense Forces returned fire with four artillery shells aimed at the launch site, without prior warning to UNIFIL. The shells did not cause any injuries or damage. Immediately after the rocket launch, all available UNIFIL manoeuvre units were operational on a continuous basis. The Lebanese Armed Forces reinforced their troops by temporarily deploying two specialized companies in Sector West, which were critical in carrying out combined activities with UNIFIL in sensitive areas and immediate response tasks. Intensified reconnaissance activities carried out by UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces led to the discovery on 9 January of a cache of 34 rockets and boxes of ammunition inside two disused bunkers in the eastern sector of the UNIFIL area of operations, between Kafr Shuba and Kafr Hamman.

8. On 14 January, rockets were fired from Sector East of the UNIFIL area of operations towards Israel. UNIFIL contacted the Israel Defense Forces, which initially informed UNIFIL that no rocket impacts had been recorded in Israel. However, about 30 minutes after the rockets were launched, the Israel Defense

Forces fired four artillery shells at the launch site, and some 20 minutes later, fired another four artillery shells at an area south-east of Al Khiyam. In both instances, the Israel Defense Forces did not warn UNIFIL of their intention to return fire. Subsequently, the Israel Defense Forces reverted to UNIFIL, claiming that three rockets had struck inside Israel. To date, however, the Israel Defense Forces have not officially confirmed to UNIFIL the rocket impacts in Israel. No injuries or damage were reported by either side. Joint UNIFIL-Lebanese Armed Forces search teams discovered a rocket launching site in the general area of Hebbariye, approximately 140 metres from a school compound, from where two rockets had been launched. Close to the site, they discovered and disarmed three more rockets that were equipped with timers and ready to be fired in the direction of Israel, as well as detonators that were set up to destroy the launch site after the rockets had been fired. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces also discovered fragments of two rockets that had impacted in the area south-east of Al Khiyam, on Lebanese territory; the second round of Israeli artillery fire was aimed at this impact site. On the basis of available evidence and information provided to UNIFIL by the parties to date, the investigation indicated that two rockets were fired in the direction of Israel, but landed inside Lebanese territory. In all likelihood, there were no other rockets fired on this occasion and no impacts, across the Blue Line, inside Israel.

9. Following the 14 January rocket launch, UNIFIL further enhanced its operational capability in the area of operations by employing enabling units to carry out patrolling activities and by limiting rotations of personnel. At the same time, the Lebanese Armed Forces temporarily deployed a third specialized company in Marjayoun. In the second half of January, the Lebanese Armed Forces Command deployed the 7th Brigade in the area between Babliye and Tyre, i.e. south and north of the Litani River, increasing the number of Lebanese Armed Forces troops in the area of operations to approximately 5,500. The focus of the Brigade's activities is on controlling the access roads into and out of the UNIFIL area of operations in Sector West. This deployment has allowed for the troops of the 6th and 11th Brigades to modify their deployment and improve their area coverage, as well as to increase the overall number of operational activities carried out by the Lebanese Armed Forces. At the end of January, the three Lebanese Armed Forces specialized companies were redeployed outside of the area of operations.

10. On 4 February, during a search operation of Wadi Hamul — the valley where the eight rockets were found on 25 December — a UNIFIL patrol discovered five rockets in their casings that were placed in a small stack on the ground and hidden among bushes, approximately five kilometres north-east of Naqoura. Lying close to the rockets, the patrol found a roll of electrical wire and some wooden sticks that could have been used as improvised ramps. In addition, some electric cables were placed in a bag on top of the rockets.

11. On 21 February, two rockets were fired from an area south of Tyre towards Israel. UNIFIL immediately contacted the Israel Defense Forces, who subsequently confirmed that one rocket had struck in Israel, in the village of Meilia, lightly injuring three people and causing some damage. In this case, the Israel Defense Forces informed UNIFIL that they would fire artillery towards the launch site, and immediately fired eight shells towards two locations. A joint UNIFIL-Lebanese Armed Forces investigation into the incident discovered the rocket launch site in a banana plantation, approximately seven kilometres south of Tyre, as well as the

impact site of the second rocket near the village of Alma Ash Shaab, approximately five kilometres east of Naqoura.

12. Throughout this period, UNIFIL's Force Commander was in continuous contact with the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces, urging both parties to exercise the utmost restraint to prevent a potential escalation of an already tense situation. The parties reiterated their continued commitment to the cessation of hostilities agreement and resolution 1701 (2006) and senior representatives of the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces worked closely with the Force Commander to contain the situation and maintain the cessation of hostilities. To this end, the Force Commander also convened a tripartite meeting on 16 January.

13. The perpetrators of these attacks have not yet been identified and there have been no claims of responsibility. The relevant Lebanese authorities have launched investigations, with a view to identifying and apprehending the perpetrators.

14. Investigations into the two earlier rocket attacks against Israel of 17 June 2007 and 8 January 2008 have not yielded any new information during this reporting period. It is important that the Lebanese authorities continue their efforts to identify the perpetrators and bring them to justice.

15. The Israel Defense Forces continued to occupy part of the village of Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line in violation of resolution 1701 (2006). As noted in my last report, the Government of Lebanon had informed the Force Commander of its readiness to accept the UNIFIL proposal to facilitate the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the area, on the condition that the Government of Israel agree to the proposal within three months and that a date for the eventual Israeli withdrawal be established. On 20 November, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, Tzipi Livni, conveyed to me in a phone call Israel's readiness to initiate discussions to clarify elements of the UNIFIL proposal. However, a date for the eventual Israeli withdrawal was not provided. Subsequently, I spoke with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel and Prime Minister Fouad Siniora of Lebanon, as well as other senior leaders of the two parties concerning the proposal and reiterated the urgent need to find an early solution to the matter. Israel has expressed its readiness to enter into discussions about the proposal that would also address the legal and humanitarian aspects related to the question of Israeli citizens living on foreign territory, and has designated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the lead interlocutor for such talks. My Special Coordinator for Lebanon and the UNIFIL Force Commander have engaged Israeli political and military authorities, respectively, to clarify the Israeli position on the proposal. On 8 February 2009, my Special Coordinator and the Force Commander met with a delegation headed by the designated representative of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, along with a representative from the Israel Defense Forces, to discuss next steps. The meeting took place in a constructive atmosphere, with Israel expressing its readiness to enter into technical discussions based on the UNIFIL proposal.

16. In addition, several other incidents and violations of the Blue Line occurred during the reporting period. On 18 November, eight Israel Defense Forces soldiers violated the Blue Line by up to 70 metres in the vicinity of United Nations position 4-34 in Sector East. The violation appeared to be inadvertent and may have been due to the use by the Israel Defense Forces of a different geodetic system. On 19 December, the Israel Defense Forces apprehended two Lebanese civilians in the vicinity of Blida (Sector East) while they were working in their field. One of the

men sustained injuries after being bitten by an Israel Defense Forces dog during the arrest. The investigation found that the two Lebanese civilians inadvertently violated the Blue Line, which cuts through their field. On 21 December, during a demonstration in the general area of Shab'a near United Nations position 4-7C (Sector East), some demonstrators violated the Blue Line and placed flags on the Israeli technical fence. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces immediately positioned their troops to prevent further violations. Subsequently, UNIFIL removed the flags and handed them to the Lebanese Armed Forces. On 3 February, Lebanese and Israeli civilians were involved in a drug smuggling incident across the Blue Line in the general area of Rumaysh. The Israel Defense Forces apprehended one Israeli civilian in possession of 20 kg of heroin, while UNIFIL discovered three Lebanese civilians in possession of 55 kg of heroin hiding in the same general area on the Lebanese side of the Blue Line, and handed them over to the Lebanese Armed Forces. There were also a number of minor ground violations by shepherds who crossed the Blue Line with their cattle. These incidents further underline the importance of accelerating the visible marking of the Blue Line.

17. There has been steady progress in the pilot project to visibly mark the Blue Line. The parties approved another extension, bringing the total stretch of the pilot project to 16 kilometres. A total of 30 points have been agreed: 9 have already been marked with Blue Line barrels, 7 markings are under construction, and 14 points will be measured by the parties. The parties also have agreed that contested points may, on a case-by-case basis, be unilaterally marked by UNIFIL. Such points will be marked by metal flags.

18. Prior to the 25 December discovery of rockets, UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces maintained their respective installations and daily operational activities at the levels detailed in my last report, including the additional patrols carried out by UNIFIL independently in response to the reduction of Lebanese Armed Forces personnel in September 2008, i.e. the deployment of three brigades rather than four. As reported previously, the two forces also continued operating six co-located checkpoints on the Litani River and two checkpoints in randomly selected locations in the area of operations, in addition to four coordinated foot patrols along the Blue Line. The two forces continued to conduct seven counter-rocket-launching operations during each 24-hour period, both day and night, during which troops patrol a selected area by vehicle and on foot and establish temporary observation posts and checkpoints to stop and check vehicles and persons moving in the area. While the tension decreased in the area of operations in the latter part of January, UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces maintained an increased operational tempo and a high level of common activities focusing on searches of specific areas that had been assessed as potential sites for launching rockets. The requirement to strengthen UNIFIL with additional manoeuvre units at company level was confirmed during the period when UNIFIL had to augment its troops in the field by employing enabling units. Efforts are under way to deploy the units soon.

19. Joint training exercises, aimed at enhancing the operational capacity of UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces, continued during the reporting period. Training activities between the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force and the Lebanese navy, including exercises extending over several days, continued apace. Material and technical support over the medium to long term remains essential to enable the

Lebanese navy to gradually assume responsibility in controlling its maritime coast and borders.

20. UNIFIL exercised full freedom of movement, in general, throughout its area of operations. The local population by and large supported the Force's activities, including during the period of heightened tension when it significantly increased its presence in most areas and intensified its activities. UNIFIL patrols were temporarily stopped by local civilians on a few occasions. The incidents were brief and resolved on the ground in cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces, with any misunderstandings clarified with local authorities. Also, in a small number of instances, civilians, mostly children and youths, threw stones at UNIFIL patrols. During a joint UNIFIL-Lebanese Armed Forces patrol on 16 January in the vicinity of Majdal Silim (Sector West), where an empty underground shelter was discovered, the local population, protesting the intrusion onto private property, scuffled with the patrols, threw stones and caused damage to two UNIFIL vehicles. A subsequent meeting between UNIFIL and local authorities was held in a positive atmosphere. The shelter was subsequently ploughed over and sealed with earth. On occasion, the operational activities of UNIFIL were closely monitored by unarmed civilians in various areas.

21. The attitude of the population towards UNIFIL remained generally positive. The Force's outreach components played a crucial role during the period of heightened tension following the two rocket attacks and the Israel Defense Forces retaliatory fire, engaging with the local population and thereby contributing to calming tensions. Outreach activities were also critical to ensuring public understanding and support for the intensified military and security operations of UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces. The provision of humanitarian support and building greater confidence among the local population in UNIFIL and its mandate remained at the centre of the activities carried out by the civil affairs and civil-military cooperation components of UNIFIL. Those components continued to implement quick-impact projects funded by the UNIFIL budget, focusing on support for basic infrastructure and capacity-building, as well as other projects funded by troop-contributing countries.

22. Ensuring that the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line is free of any unauthorized armed personnel, assets or weapons, as stipulated by resolution 1701 (2006), is a long-term endeavour. The rocket attacks and the findings during the reporting period demonstrate that there are still weapons and hostile armed elements ready to use them within the area of operations. This makes it imperative on the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL to intensify their combined efforts to prevent possible smuggling of weapons across the Litani River, to discover and remove all weapons and related materiel that may still be present in the area and to make sure that there are no armed elements in the area. In the aftermath of the recent incidents, the two forces agreed to redouble their efforts in this regard.

23. The activities of the two forces since late December 2008 resulted in the discovery of eight abandoned armed-element facilities, one shelter and four caves. As with previous discoveries, the facilities showed no recent use and dated back to the 2006 war or before. The Lebanese Armed Forces destroyed the rockets that were found on 25 December, 9 January and 4 February. UNIFIL routinely checked former armed-element facilities in the area of operations, including bunkers and caves, but

has not found any indication that these have been reactivated or any evidence of new military infrastructure in its area of operations.

24. Concerning the rockets that were recently launched and discovered, on the basis of all available evidence, UNIFIL is not in a position to determine whether the rockets were already present in the area of operations between the Litani River and the Blue Line or were smuggled into the area prior to the attacks. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces continue to improve monitoring and control along the Litani River and throughout the area of operations.

25. On a number of occasions, UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces encountered civilians armed with hunting rifles. On each occasion, the Lebanese Armed Forces acted in accordance with the ban on hunting and the carrying of weapons in the area of operations and arrested a number of hunters. UNIFIL immediately followed up on all alleged incidents of weapons fire in its area of operations.

26. The Government of Israel maintains that Hizbullah is continuing to build its military presence and capacity, largely north of the Litani River, but also in the UNIFIL area of operations, using, in particular, private houses in urban areas. The Israeli Government also alleged that Hizbullah held manoeuvres both north and south of the Litani River on 22 November 2008. UNIFIL did not observe any activity in its area of operations on 22 November 2008 that would substantiate that claim. Israeli authorities also point to the latest rocket attacks as evidence of the presence of armed elements and illegal weapons in the UNIFIL area of operations, which are being used for hostile activities against Israel. As I described in my previous reports, UNIFIL in collaboration with the Lebanese Armed Forces, immediately investigates any claims regarding the illegal presence of armed personnel or weapons within its area of operations if specific information is received. UNIFIL patrols throughout its area of operations, including in urban areas, and conducts surveillance and monitoring activities, particularly at entry points and suspicious areas, and remains determined to act with all necessary means within its mandate. However, according to its mandate, UNIFIL cannot search private houses and properties unless there is credible evidence of a violation of resolution 1701 (2006), including an imminent threat of hostile activity emanating from that specific location. The Lebanese Armed Forces Command has confirmed that it will investigate any claims and will act immediately on evidence of unauthorized armed personnel or weapons in the area.

27. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force continued the maritime interdiction operation along the Lebanese coast, to prevent the entry of unauthorized arms and related materiel, as well as the training of the Lebanese navy. Since the start of its mission in October 2006, the Maritime Task Force has hailed and queried more than 21,980 ships in its area of operations. Since my last report, an additional 55 inspections were carried out on vessels that were identified as suspicious, increasing the total number to 240 since the inception of the Maritime Task Force. The Lebanese navy and Lebanese Customs inspected the vessels to verify that there were no unauthorized arms or related materiel on board and cleared all of them. In January, the Lebanese navy took over responsibility for the hailing of vessels approaching Beirut harbour, while the Maritime Task Force assumed a monitoring role in that sector of the area of maritime operations.

28. Israel Defense Forces patrol boats south of the line of buoys continued to regularly drop explosive charges or fire warning shots at Lebanese fishing boats in the vicinity of the line. Over the past two months, UNIFIL also reported the increased use of spotlighting into Lebanese territorial waters. While UNIFIL has no mandate to monitor the line of buoys, which was installed by Israel, such incidents have the potential to raise tension between the parties.

B. Security and liaison arrangements

29. The tripartite meetings, chaired by the Force Commander with senior representatives of the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces, continued to be an indispensable instrument to address key security and military operational issues, as well as an essential mechanism to build confidence between the parties and prevent escalation. The parties met within days of the rocket incidents of 8 and 14 January, while investigations were still ongoing, which underscored their commitment to the forum and its importance in addressing key issues related to the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).

30. For the first time since the establishment of UNIFIL, the President of Lebanon, Michel Sleiman, visited UNIFIL headquarters on 27 December 2008. He was accompanied by the Minister of Defence, Elias Murr, the Commander of the Lebanese army, General Jean Qahwaji, and the Director of General Security, General Wafik Jezzini. The visit demonstrated the strong commitment of the Lebanese State to resolution 1701 (2006) and the importance of the partnership between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces. The strategic dialogue between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces senior command continued on a regular basis, focusing on further enhancing the conduct and coordination of military activities of the two forces in the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). The last meeting took place on 15 January and focused on harmonizing procedures and coordination of combined UNIFIL and Lebanese Armed Forces activities, particularly in view of the recent intensified operations of both forces. The return of a fourth Lebanese Armed Forces brigade to southern Lebanon enabled the Lebanese Armed Forces to match the deployment of its forces to a large degree with those of the UNIFIL battalions, thereby facilitating the coordination and conduct of combined activities. Enhanced detailed procedures for combined activities are currently being finalized between the two forces.

31. Coordination and liaison with the Israel Defense Forces remained smooth and efficient. Measures to ensure increased liaison and coordination at sea and prevent misunderstandings in the international waters of the UNIFIL area of maritime operations have been taken. The Force Commander maintained close and productive relations with his Israel Defense Forces counterparts, as well as with other senior Israeli officials. UNIFIL maintains a liaison team with two officers at the Israel Defense Forces Northern Command headquarters in Zefat. As reported earlier, the Government of Israel agreed to the establishment of the UNIFIL office in Tel Aviv in February 2007. Since my last report, there has been no progress on the establishment of the office. The Israel Defense Forces verbally informed UNIFIL that it saw no need for the office since, in its view, UNIFIL, and especially the Force Commander, already had developed and were maintaining sufficient contacts at the strategic level with all the relevant Israeli interlocutors. UNIFIL will continue to seek the establishment of an office in Tel Aviv, as agreed to by the Government of

Israel, as it would enhance the current level of liaison and allow for a strategic-level dialogue with the Israel Defense Forces and other Israeli authorities on UNIFIL-related issues.

C. Disarming armed groups

32. As indicated in my previous reports, Hizbullah continues to maintain a substantial military capacity distinct from that of the Lebanese State, in direct contravention of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006). This military capacity continues to pose a serious challenge to the ability of the Lebanese State to exercise full sovereignty over its territory. As I have previously reported, I continue to believe that the disarmament of all armed groups should take place through a Lebanese-led political process, so that there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State.

33. Two additional sessions of the National Dialogue were chaired by the President during the reporting period, on 22 December 2008 and 26 January 2009. The last session resulted, inter alia, in an agreement to form a group of experts charged with summarizing commonalities of proposals on the national defence strategy made by participants, with the aim of integrating them in a single text that will be presented to the table of dialogue. The participants also agreed to pursue efforts to implement the agreements reached during the National Dialogue conference of 2006, which called for dismantling Palestinian weaponry outside refugee camps within six months. The next session of the National Dialogue is scheduled for 2 March.

34. During the period under review, there have been reports of significant reinforcements of the presence of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah el Intifada in the bases they occupy south of Beirut and along the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. The United Nations takes these reports seriously but does not have the means to independently verify this information.

35. The security situation within Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon remains precarious. There remain fears that the contentious relations that exist between Palestinian groups, combined with conditions of hardship within the camps, may strengthen radical militant groups operating inside the camps. According to Lebanese Government reports, Hamas is seeking to strengthen and regroup its members in the refugee camps. While there continues to be concern at the frequency of security incidents inside the refugee camps, there is also increased cooperation on camp security between the Lebanese authorities and Palestinian factions.

D. Arms embargo

36. In resolution 1701 (2006) the Security Council called for the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points so as to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related materiel. The Council further decided that all States were to prevent the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to entities or individuals in Lebanon by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft.

37. Mindful of the recommendations made by the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team II on 26 August 2008, the Government adopted a decision on 20 December that (a) reaffirmed the commitment of Lebanon to control its land, sea and air borders; (b) extended the model of the Common Border Force used for the northern border to an additional segment of the eastern border; (c) created a steering committee on borders under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister and composed of the Ministers of Defence, Public Works, Foreign Affairs and Emigrants, Finance and the Interior tasked with making the necessary recommendations regarding border control; and (d) requested that international partners be kept informed of progress on this issue.

38. A border commission, under the leadership of the Lebanese Armed Forces and with participation from the Internal Security Forces, Customs and the General Security was tasked with developing an operational proposal for implementation of the Cabinet decision to extend the model of the Common Border Force. The border commission finalized a draft operational plan to be presented to the heads of the four security agencies and to the ministerial-level steering committee. The plan foresees the extension of the model of the Common Border Force to an additional 82 kilometres of the northern part of the eastern border. Once this plan is approved by the steering committee, it will be presented for comments to the main donors involved in border programmes. Provided funding for equipment, recruitment and training is available, the extension could take place in the second half of 2009. This may be followed in due course by a further extension along the eastern border.

39. In parallel, progress was made regarding the functioning of the Common Border Force which currently operates along 90 kilometres of land border in the north. Cooperation among the four security agencies involved in the Common Border Force has gradually improved. No weapons or armaments were reported to have been seized during the reporting period. The Force did have some success in preventing smuggling of commercial goods.

40. Military authorities in Lebanon informed my Special Coordinator that the deployment of Syrian troops along Lebanon's northern and eastern borders, which started in September 2008, continues. Syrian authorities reiterated to my Special Coordinator their view that this deployment was intended to prevent smuggling and sabotage, noting that the deployment is a direct outcome of the summit between the Presidents of the two countries held in August 2008.

41. There have been no confirmed incidents of arms smuggling during the reporting period. The Government of Israel continues to report significant breaches of the arms embargo across the Lebanese-Syrian border. Those allegations were reiterated to my Special Coordinator in meetings he held with senior Israeli officials on 9 February. Although the United Nations takes these allegations seriously, it is not in a position to verify this information independently. In meetings with my Special Coordinator in Damascus on 11 February, Syrian officials denied any involvement by Syria in potential breaches of the arms embargo.

42. As indicated in previous reports on the implementation of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006), the existence of military bases belonging to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and to Fatah el Intifada along the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic continues to pose a serious challenge for the control of the common border. In this context, cooperation between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic to better manage their common

border still needs to be further developed. I continue to call upon Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic to address this grave anomaly so as to ensure that Lebanon exerts full control over its territory, including all of its borders.

E. Landmines and cluster bombs

43. With effect from 1 January 2009, the United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre-South Lebanon transferred primary responsibility for the coordination of humanitarian clearance operations to the Lebanese Armed Forces in the form of the Lebanese Mine Action Centre. This transfer has divided the joint structure of the South Lebanon Coordination Centre into its component parts, the Lebanese Armed Forces and the United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre. The Lebanese Armed Forces component will continue its work as a part of the Lebanese Regional Mine Action Centre in Nabatieh, while the United Nations staff will work exclusively in support of UNIFIL clearance and explosive ordnance disposal assets and maintain liaison between the Regional Mine Action Centre and UNIFIL.

44. During the reporting period, three additional cluster bomb strike locations were identified, bringing the total locations recorded thus far to 1,061. The estimated contaminated area remains at 48.1 million square metres, as defined by the operational reassessment in the summer of 2008. To date, the United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre and, as at 1 January, the Regional Mine Action Centre, have coordinated the clearance of 43 million square metres of the contaminated areas through the joint efforts of the Lebanese Armed Forces, UNIFIL and international clearance organizations. Since the end of the 2006 conflict, 154,733 cluster munitions have been located and destroyed.

45. The enhanced operational presence of UNIFIL since late December 2008 led to a significant increase in the quantity of unexploded ordnance discovered. In total, UNIFIL discovered and cleared 122 mortars, artillery shells and mines, among other objects, throughout the area of operations.

46. Since the last report, incidents involving unexploded ordnance, including cluster munitions, have injured four civilians, bringing the total since the end of the conflict to 27 fatalities and 238 injuries among civilians. Two accidents occurred during clearance operations in this reporting period, resulting in injury to two clearance workers and bringing the total number of casualties due to clearance activities to 57, with 14 fatalities and 43 injured.

47. In 2009, an estimated 12 million square metres of land remains to be cleared. Half this area has had no clearance, while the other half has been surface cleared but requires secondary sub-surface clearance. Owing to lack of funding, only five of the seven clearance organizations operational in 2008 will continue in 2009. This reduction of clearance capacity threatens to disrupt the momentum of clearance operations that has to date resulted in a steady reduction in the civilian casualty rate, saving many lives.

48. Since my last report to the Security Council, there has been no progress in receiving from Israel the technical strike data on the number, type and location of munitions fired in the 2006 conflict. In the absence of those data, the level of contamination continues to remain uncertain. United Nations efforts, both in the

field and at Headquarters, to obtain the technical strike data on cluster munitions have continued. My Special Coordinator was assured by the Israel Defense Forces in meetings in Tel Aviv on 9 February that the technical work on the strike data had been completed and was awaiting political approval for its release to UNIFIL.

F. Delineation of borders

49. In pursuance of the implementation of paragraph 10 of resolution 1701 (2006) and of paragraph 4 of resolution 1680 (2006), calling for the delineation of the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, I have continued to call on the Governments of both countries to reach an agreement on their common border.

50. In my last report on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), I welcomed the agreement reached between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic to reactivate the Lebanese-Syrian border committee tasked with delineating their common border. On 23 December 2008, President Sleiman issued a presidential decree naming the Lebanese members of the joint committee. The Government of Lebanon has notified the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic that its delegation to the joint border committee has been formed, so that the committee could meet. To date, the Government has received no reaction to this communication. Syrian authorities, however, explained to my Special Coordinator on 11 February that currently the Syrian Arab Republic lacks the technical capacity to delineate its borders with Lebanon. It has also not nominated its members to the committee.

51. In my last reports on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), I indicated my intention to strengthen the diplomatic process aimed at resolving the question of the Shab'a Farms in accordance with paragraph 10 of that resolution. I have carried out consultations on this issue during my visit to the region in January and through my Special Coordinator. I am, however, unable to report any significant progress on this subject. While Syrian officials continue to maintain that the Shab'a Farms area is Lebanese, officials from both the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel maintain that resolution of the question is an issue to be addressed within the context of resolving the question of the Israeli-occupied Syrian Golan. Furthermore, with respect to the geographical definition of the Shab'a Farms, I have still not received any official response to the provisional definition from either Israel or the Syrian Arab Republic despite repeated requests.

III. Security and safety of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

52. The security and safety of UNIFIL personnel remains a priority. During the Gaza crisis, the volatility of the overall security situation in southern Lebanon increased and, on a number of occasions, the Mission received specific threat warnings. UNIFIL and the Lebanese authorities and Lebanese Armed Forces have maintained their cooperation and joint efforts to ensure that security threats to UNIFIL are addressed appropriately. Notwithstanding the obligation of all parties to ensure the safety and security of UNIFIL and the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon for law and order, UNIFIL continues to review regularly its procedures and focuses on mitigating risk to its personnel, assets and installations, while ensuring mandate implementation.

53. Spanish and Lebanese authorities continue their respective investigations into the 24 June 2007 attack against UNIFIL, which killed six peacekeepers serving with the Spanish contingent. Evidence made available to both parties after the last joint meeting in October 2008 is being examined and a detailed report is pending. In the court case against a group of defendants being tried on a series of terrorist charges, including in the 16 July 2007 attack against UNIFIL at Qasmieh Bridge, trial hearings were held on 14 January and 4 February, during which the eight defendants who are in custody were questioned. The remaining six defendants are being tried in absentia. A plea to transfer the case from the military to a civilian court was rejected. In respect of the 8 January 2008 attack against UNIFIL near Saida, Lebanese authorities are holding one suspect in custody while four others are at large. A trial hearing took place on 23 January and the next one is scheduled for 27 March. If the suspects that remain at large cannot be presented at the next meeting, the court will proceed with the case and try them in absentia.

IV. Deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

54. As at 18 February, the total military strength of UNIFIL was 12,559 personnel, with a civilian strength of 331 international and 656 national staff members. UNIFIL is supported by 51 United Nations Truce Supervision Organization military observers of the Observer Group Lebanon. Engineering works for the expansion of the Naqoura headquarters are progressing according to schedule and the first part of the phased move of UNIFIL assets and facilities will start in April 2009. Efforts to secure the improved air surveillance assets that the Force requires are ongoing.

55. Since December, the Maritime Task Force has been reduced from 12 to 9 vessels. It is currently comprised of two frigates, three corvettes, three patrol boats and one support vessel. The reduced number of frigates in particular has meant that the periods at sea for corvettes, which are being substituted for the missing frigates, had to be extended significantly. With the current composition, the Maritime Task Force cannot fully sustain its mandate over an extended period of time. At the end of February, the European Maritime Force, currently under the command of France, will hand over the leadership of the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force to Belgium.

V. Observations

56. Tension along the Blue Line increased substantially as a result of the rocket attacks at the time of the hostilities in Gaza. These attacks and the return fire strained the security and liaison arrangements established under resolution 1701 (2006) and endangered the cessation of hostilities agreement. This period was the most serious challenge for the parties and UNIFIL since the adoption of resolution 1701 (2006). I witnessed the heightened tension at first hand during a tour of the region in January which included visits to Israel, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. At the same time, I was encouraged by the measures that were taken by all parties to avoid an escalation. I believe that the mechanisms related to the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) have acted as an effective deterrent and prevented an escalation of the situation in southern Lebanon. Nevertheless, the fact that rockets were fired on 21 February is worrying.

57. The firing of rockets from southern Lebanon towards Israel, which I condemn in all instances, constituted serious violations of resolution 1701 (2006). These hostile activities were carried out from within the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line — an area that should be free of any unauthorized armed personnel, assets and weapons as stipulated in resolution 1701 (2006). It is a cause of serious concern that the 8 January and 14 January rocket attacks were launched from sites close to populated areas, including a school occupied by students at the time, putting innocent civilians at risk. The Lebanese authorities have the primary responsibility to ensure that there are no unauthorized armed personnel, assets or weapons in the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line. UNIFIL supports the Lebanese Armed Forces in this endeavour.

58. The fact that the Israel Defense Forces returned fire with artillery shells into Lebanese territory on 8 and 14 January without providing prior warning to UNIFIL is also a cause of serious concern. This decision endangered innocent civilians, as well as UNIFIL and Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers who were intensively patrolling the area at the time. In the 21 February incident, while the Israel Defense Forces informed UNIFIL of their intention to return fire, it may be recalled that, in accordance with the cessation of hostilities agreement, Israel should immediately notify UNIFIL if it has been fired upon, refraining from responding except where clearly required in immediate self-defence, and allowing, in the first instance, UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces to deal with such attacks.

59. The Lebanese Armed Forces remain the key partner of UNIFIL in the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). I continue to urge the Government of Lebanon to ensure that the Lebanese Armed Forces maintains a presence in the south commensurate with the important tasks they must perform there, in line with Lebanon's obligations under resolution 1701 (2006). In this regard, I acknowledge the quick augmentation of Lebanese Armed Forces troops, including specialized units, in the south during the period of heightened tensions in the UNIFIL area of operations, as well as the significant increase in common operational activities with UNIFIL which has been sustained since that time. The support of the international community remains critical for the Lebanese Armed Forces to become an adequately equipped and capable force that will be able to assume effective security responsibility over the current area of UNIFIL operations.

60. I am grateful to all the troop-contributing countries for their continued commitment to UNIFIL and to the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). The need for this continued commitment and support, including the contribution of troops and assets necessary to enable UNIFIL to efficiently and effectively perform all of its mandated activities on land and at sea, cannot be overstated. I wish to strongly commend the UNIFIL Force Commander and the military and civilian peacekeeping personnel who continue to play a critical role in helping to promote peace and stability in southern Lebanon, as well as the Special Coordinator for Lebanon and the staff of his Office. At the same time, I remain concerned for the safety and security of United Nations personnel and urge all parties to abide by their obligation to ensure their safety and security.

61. In partnership with the Lebanese Armed Forces, and with the commitment and contributions of troop and maritime contributors, UNIFIL has provided a strong deterrent to the resumption of hostilities and has laid a foundation on which a process towards achieving a permanent ceasefire can and must be built. This has

been achieved as a result of the significant deployment of troops and maritime assets, involving substantial financial resources and the strong commitment of many troop-contributing countries. But this cannot be sustained indefinitely and the window of opportunity provided by the UNIFIL deployment should be seized. It is now up to the parties concerned to use this opportunity to move towards a long-term solution as envisaged in resolution 1701 (2006). To that end, I call upon the parties to focus on all outstanding issues.

62. In accordance with its obligations under resolution 1701 (2006), Israel must complete its withdrawal from southern Lebanon. In order to achieve this, the continued occupation by the Israel Defense Forces of the northern part of the village of Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line must be ended. Inevitably, the Gaza crisis overshadowed attempts at making progress on the resolution of this issue. However, there were encouraging developments at a meeting held by my Special Coordinator and the UNIFIL Force Commander with Israeli officials on 8 February to discuss the implementation of the UNIFIL proposal for Ghajar. I renew my call on the parties to proceed on the basis of the UNIFIL proposal so as to facilitate the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces in accordance with Israel's obligations under resolution 1701 (2006).

63. I am pleased to note that the parties have made progress, in cooperation with UNIFIL, to visibly mark the Blue Line. I encourage Lebanon and Israel to maintain their constructive engagement and to build on the existing momentum and accelerate the visible marking of the Blue Line in order to reduce inadvertent violations and build confidence.

64. I reiterate my call upon Israel to cease immediately all overflights of Lebanese territory, as they are violations of Lebanese sovereignty and resolution 1701 (2006) and undermine the credibility of UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces.

65. I remain concerned about the Government of Israel's failure to date to provide the technical strike data on the type, quantity and specific coordinates of the sub-munitions fired during the 2006 conflict. I emphasize the importance of that information to speed up the clearance operations and reduce the number of casualties among civilians and mine-clearance experts. I urge the Government of Israel to take prompt action to provide this information with the utmost urgency.

66. The presence of armed groups outside the control of the State poses a continuous threat to Lebanon's sovereignty and stability, and it hampers the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).

67. I am encouraged by the fact that a National Dialogue that touches upon the fundamentals of the relation between the State and the armed groups has been set in motion, with four sessions held so far at which agreement was reached on mechanisms to further advance the discussion. I call upon Lebanon's leaders to rise to the expectations created by the National Dialogue and address these core issues facing the country.

68. I am concerned by the continued presence of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah el Intifada military bases in Lebanon and the threat they pose to Lebanon's stability. I call upon the Government of Lebanon to dismantle these military bases, as agreed upon in the National Dialogue, and on the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, which has influence on these groups, to support fully efforts in this regard. I regret the unwillingness of

the Syrian Arab Republic to engage on the issue as conveyed to my Special Coordinator by senior officials in Damascus on 11 February.

69. Efforts to delineate and demarcate the common border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic must not be delayed, starting with the activation of the Lebanese-Syrian border committee. The delineation of borders is critical to a positive relationship between the two countries. I urge the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate with the Government of Lebanon in taking concrete and practical steps without delay towards achieving this goal, in accordance with resolutions 1701 (2006) and 1680 (2006). The United Nations stands ready to provide assistance to the parties as required.

70. I will continue my diplomatic efforts aimed at resolving the issue of the Shab'a Farms area, in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution 1701 (2006) and in spite of the lack of willingness of both Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic to resolve the issue at this time.

71. The control of the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic and immediate and unconditional respect for the arms embargo on Lebanon are fundamental aspects of resolution 1701 (2006). They must be observed in full and without exception, as these elements are of crucial importance to ensure that the flow of weapons to groups outside the control of the state stops. Regional parties, particularly those that maintain ties with Hizbullah and other groups in Lebanon, are obliged to abide fully by the arms embargo. Any breach of it is a violation of Lebanese sovereignty and threatens the stability of the country and of the region as a whole.

72. Although more needs to be done to improve border management in Lebanon, efforts being made by the Government are bearing fruit. In this respect, I commend the Government for the initial steps it has taken to design a comprehensive border strategy, as called for by the report of the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team II. I encourage it to further persevere in these efforts. I am grateful to donor States that have continued to provide much-needed assistance to Lebanon in this area. A Lebanese strategy for border management would provide a useful mechanism to better coordinate this assistance, as highlighted in the report of the Border Assessment Team. I encourage the Government of Lebanon to engage in a dialogue with donors on the substance of the plans being prepared so that lessons can be learned from previous projects, including the Common Border Force, in preparation for the next phase.

73. Without prejudice to the settlement of the Palestinian refugee question in the context of a comprehensive peace agreement, it is imperative that progress be made without delay in taking concrete and practical steps, including new legislation, to improve the conditions in which Palestinian refugees live in Lebanon. I commend the steps already taken by the Government of Lebanon in this regard. Yet, I urge it to persevere in its efforts and do more. Similarly, while I thank donor countries that have responded generously to the appeals issued by the Government of Lebanon and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for the reconstruction of the Nahr el-Bared refugee camp and adjacent affected Lebanese communities, I reiterate my appeal for additional contributions, which are urgently required.

74. It is clear that compliance by the parties with the obligations imposed by the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) requires strong political determination in both Israel and Lebanon. In this sense, the months to come will carry new challenges, and also opportunities, for both countries. I expect the parties to seize the occasion to make renewed efforts towards the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) so as to move from the current state of cessation of hostilities to a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution between Israel and Lebanon.

75. The conduct of the electoral campaign in Lebanon ahead of the 7 June parliamentary elections will bring added challenges that may test the country's frail domestic stability. While I am encouraged by the climate of relative calm that currently prevails in Lebanon, I call upon all Lebanese leaders to exercise restraint, particularly in the context of the campaign, and ensure that the elections are conducted in a free and fair manner and in an environment free of violence, intimidation and incitement.

76. I am encouraged by the progress made in the bilateral relationship between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, particularly as concerns the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and I look forward to the early conclusion of the remaining steps in this regard, as required by Security Council resolutions.

77. It continues to be my profound conviction that we must exert all possible efforts to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East on the basis of the implementation of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), which remains interdependent with the full territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon.

United Nations S/2009/120

Security Council

Distr.: General
3 March 2009

Original: English

Letter dated 3 March 2009 from the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the presidency of the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, I should be grateful if you would circulate the statement of the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries on Guinea-Bissau, enclosed herewith (see annex), as a document of the Security Council of the United Nations.

The statement was approved by the Permanent Consultation Committee of the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, during an extraordinary meeting held in Lisbon on 2 March 2009.

(*Signed*) José Filipe **Moraes Cabral**
Ambassador

09-25389 (E) 040309

Annex to the letter dated 3 March 2009 from the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries on Guinea-Bissau

2 March 2009

1. The Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP) expresses its deep regrets for the decease of His Excellency the President of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, General João Bernardo Vieira, and presents its condolences to His Excellency the President of the National Assembly and to the people of Guinea-Bissau.

2. CPLP strongly condemns the attacks that resulted in the death, in Bissau, of the President of the Republic, General João Bernardo Vieira, and of the Chief of Staff, General Batista Tagmé Na Waié.

3. CPLP calls on all institutional and political parties to respect the constitutional order and the normal functioning of the democratically elected institutions.

4. CPLP expresses its solidarity with the people of Guinea-Bissau and welcomes the peaceful and calm manner in which the people has been reacting to the events in the country.

5. CPLP reiterates its willingness to pursue, together with the democratically elected Government of Guinea-Bissau, all endeavours leading to peace, to the consolidation of democracy and to the social and economic development of the country.

6. CPLP would like to remind all the responsible entities in Guinea-Bissau of the importance of guaranteeing political, military and social stability, allowing for the continuation of the dialogue with the partners for development, in order to ensure that the reform programmes necessary to the modernization and progress of the country will be carried out.

7. CPLP underlines that the CPLP programme to support stability in Guinea-Bissau, adopted on 25 November 2008, based on three pillars, namely (1) firm and efficient combat against drug trafficking; (2) reform of the security sector; (3) ,,mobilization of the international resources for the development of Guinea-Bissau, requires, as indispensable conditions for its implementation, the political stability and the normal functioning of all institutions. This will be the only way to effectively mobilize the main international partners for the effective development of Guinea-Bissau.

8. In this context, CPLP has decided to send, in the next few days, a political mission to Bissau, for consultations with the Guinea-Bissau institutions in order to promote internal dialogue.

9. CPLP further reiterates its commitment to continue its actions and initiatives, in close coordination with the relevant international and regional organizations, in particular with the United Nations, the European Union and ECOWAS, to ensure that the best use will be made of all available means and resources, in a complementary manner.

09-25389

United Nations S/2009/121

Security Council

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3 March 2009

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Letter dated 27 February 2009 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT).

Following the usual consultations, I intend to appoint Major General Elhadji Mouhamedou Kandji (Senegal) as Force Commander of MINURCAT. Major General Kandji will be the first Force Commander of the Mission following the transfer of authority from the European Union forces in Chad and the Central African Republic on 15 March 2009.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Ban** Ki-moon

09-25428 (E) 030309

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Security Council

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3 March 2009

Original: English

Letter dated 3 March 2009 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 27 February 2009 (S/2009/121) concerning your intention to appoint Major General Elhadji Mouhamedou Kandji (Senegal) as Force Commander of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the intention expressed in your letter.

(*Signed*) Ibrahim O. A. **Dabbashi**
President of the Security Council

09-25435 (E) 030309